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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT LUKUS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10029 
This case, which is presented pursuant to a writ of 
certiorari, calls for a review by the Supreme Court of the 
Industrial Commission's proceedings and Order for the 
purpose of determining whether the Industrial Commission 
exceeded its power and authority and whether or not the 
findings of fact and evidence introduced support the Com-
mission's decision. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The plaintiff was denied coverage of an alleged indus-
trial accident claim and thereafter made application for a 
hearing to settle the industrial accident claim on the 16th 
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2 
day of February, 1963. The claim came on for hearing 
after a postponement of the original hearing date, and the 
Industrial Commission made its Order denying the appli-
cant's claim on August 15, 1963. On or about the 12th day 
of September, 1963, the plaintiff filed a petition for re-
hearing by his attorney, Norman H. Jackson, and the peti-
tion for rehearing was formally denied by the Industrial 
Commission on the 23rd day of September, 1963. On the 
3rd day of December, 1963, a writ of certiorari was filed 
for review by this court. 
DISPOSITION SOUGHT BY THE DEFENDANT 
The defendant Industrial Commission asks that the 
Supreme Court affirm the Order (R. 99) of the Industrial 
Commission which found that at the time of the injury the 
plaintiff was not an employee but was in fact an indepen-
dent contractor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 24th day of December, 1962, Mr. Ray Townsley 
called the plaintiff regarding some cutting and welding on 
an oil rig in the Kanab Creek Unit, Utah. On the 26th day 
of December the plaintiff, furnishing his own transporta-
tion and taking with him his own cutting machine and 
tools, arc welder, welding rod, and other supplies (R. 49, 
50), arrived at the site at approximately 10 :00 o'clock a.m. 
on the said 26th day of December, 1962 (R. 45). Plaintiff 
carried his own equipment, tools, and supplies in his own 
truck from his home in Fredonia to the site of work, which 
takes approximately 20 minutes. The plaintiff's regular 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
hourly rate for welding was $4.00, but the plaintiff was 
paid $6.00 an hour, pursuant to agreement, to compensate 
for equipment, tools, and supplies furnished, together with 
transportation (R. 51, 54, 55). 
Mr. Townsley of Mountain States Drilling Company 
directed the plaintiff as to what work should be done, but 
left the plaintiff with full discretion and freedom as to how 
to do the cutting and welding of the job shown, but in no 
way did Mr. Townsley or any other employee of Mountain 
States Drilling Company or Superior Oil Company attempt 
to direct or control the cutting and welding which the 
plaintiff was doing (R. 46, 51, 52). While the plaintiff 
was cutting off a valve, the valve fell onto the plaintiff's 
right hand and cut off plaintiff's index finger, which was 
sewed back on by a doctor (R. 40, 41, 47). The plaintiff 
submitted a bill on his own contractor form showing five 
hours of cutting and welding at an hourly charge of $6.00, 
for a total payment of $30.00 (R. 80), and submitted this 
bill to Superior Oil Company through Mr. Ray Townsley, 
who was an employee of Mointain States Drilling Company. 
Superior Oil Company made the $30.00 payment (R. 94) 
without deducting federal or state withholding taxes, social 
security or any other withholding. 
Superior Oil Company and Mountain States Drilling 
Company denied that the plaintiff was an employee of 
either or both of these companies and insist plaintiff was 
an independent contractor (R. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 25) . Thereupon 
plaintiff submitted an application for a hearing before the 
Industrial Commission for a determination of the claim 
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for workmen's compensation coverage (R. 9, 10). The 
record discloses that there was considerable correspondence 
between the plaintiff and the defendant, as well as the 
American Insurance Company, Mountain States Drilling 
Company and the State Insurance Fund, showing that the 
plaintiff was very active in proclaiming his cause (R. 11, 
21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29). The Industrial Commission, 
pursuant to request, set the matter for hearing on the 6th 
day of May, 1963, and sent a copy of the notice of hearing 
to all parties concerned, including the plaintiff (R. 30). 
By letter of April 29, 1963 from the Industrial Commission, 
notice was given to all parties concerned, including the 
plaintiff, that the hearing set for May 6, 1963 at 9:00 
o'clock a.m., was continued without date, and that the 
reason for this continuance was the inability of securing 
a witness asked by the State Insurance Fund, who was 
Mr. Ray Townsley (R. 33, 34). Thereupon the plaintiff 
wrote to the Industrial Commission requesting another 
hearing date before the Conunission (R. 35). Notice of 
taking a deposition of Mr. Ray Townsley was sent the 4th 
day of June, 1963, to all the interested parties, including 
the plaintiff (R. 36, 37). The new hearing date was set 
by the Industrial Commission, and notice thereof was sent 
on the 18th day of June, 1963, to all parties concerned, in-
cluding the plaintiff, that the new hearing date was the 
16th day of July, 1963 (R. 38). The plaintiff sent in a re-
quest for a physical examination by the Medical Advisory 
Board on the same date of July 16, 1963 (R. 39). 
On the date of July 16, the plaintiff did appear before 
the Industrial Commission, and the other parties being 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
present, a hearing was held (R. 42 through 79), and the 
various exhibits 1 through 4 were admitted, including the 
deposition of Ray Townsley, also known as Eddie R. 
Townsley. The Order of the Commission denying the claim 
of the plaintiff was dated August 15, 1963, and sent to the 
various parties interested, including the plaintiff (R. 99). 
A petition and application for rehearing was filed on behalf 
of the plaintiff by Mr. Norman Jackson, attorney at law, on 
September 12, 1963. The petition for rehearing was form-
ally denied on September 23, 1963, and a copy of the denial 
was sent to the interest parties, including the plaintiff, but 
not to his attorney, Mr. Norman Jackson (R. 101, 102). 
On September 27, Mr. Norman Jackson sent a letter to the 
Industrial Commission, enclosing therewith his brief (R. 
103 through 111). There is correspondence between Mr. 
Jackson and the Industrial Commission from October 2 to 
November 19, 1963, concerning the petition for rehearing 
and its denial (R. 112 through 115). The writ of certiorari 
was filed December 3, 1963 in the Utah Supreme Court (R. 
116). 
On February 3, 1964, plaintiff brought a motion before 
the Supreme Court to have parties defendant, to wit, Moun-
tain States Drilling Company, Inc., State Insurance Fund, 
Superior Oil Company, and Associated Indemnity Com-
pany, added as co-parties defendant. The defendant In-
dustrial Commission answered the motion and requested 
that the motion to amend and bring in additional parties be 
denied, and furthermore, prayed that the writ of certiorari 
be dismissed with costs. The Supreme Court denied plain-
tiff's motion to add parties defendant, and the relief prayed 
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6 
for by defendant Industrial Commission as to dismissal of 
the writ of certiorari is reserved for final determination 
in this rna tter. 
All notices and communications between the parties in 
the record were by mail as evidenced by Exhibit A of de· 
fendant's answer to plaintiff's motion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION SHOULD BE GRANTED AND THE 
\VRIT OF CERTIORARI OF PLAINTIFF BE 
DISMISSED. 
The exclusive remedy for a writ of certiorari is stated 
in Section 35-1-83, U. C. A. 1953, as follows: 
"Within thirty days after notice that the appli-
cation for a rehearing is denied, or, if the applica-
tion is granted within thirty days after notice of 
the rendition of the decision on the rehearing, any 
party including the commission of finance affected 
thereby may apply to the Supreme Court for a writ 
of certiorari for the purpose of having the lawful-
ness of the original award or the award on rehear-
ing inquired into and determined." (Emphasis 
added.) 
This section has had an interesting background prior 
to the amendment of this section which theretofore did not 
require notice of the denial of the application for rehearing. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Woldberg v. Industrial 
Commission, 74 Utah 309, 279 Pac. 609, required, and in 
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Heledakis v. Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 608, 245 Pac. 
334, stated, that it was mandatory that for a writ of cer-
tiorari to be considered properly by this court, said writ 
had to be filed within thirty days after the denial of the 
petition for rehearing. 
In Utah Fuel Company v. Industrial Commission, 73 
Utah 199, 273 Pac. 306, a writ of certiorari was denied 
to the plaintiff on the basis that the writ had not been 
filed within thirty days after the denial of a petition for 
rehearing, and even though an affidavit did show that the 
counsel for plaintiff was not given notice of such denial 
and that plaintiff himself was not given notice of the de-
nial, and even though counsel for plaintiff had appeared 
at the office of the Industrial Commission within 30 days 
after plaintiff's motion for rehearing was denied, to in-
quire about the decision of the case, and counsel was in-
formed erroneously that no ruling or decision had been 
made, and in fact counsel did not receive notice until after 
the thirty days had expired, the Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that the thirty-day period was a mandatory rule for juris-
diction and that since it had not been complied with, the 
Utah Supreme Court could not take jurisdiction, and dis-
missed the writ. The rule definitely seems to be that, al-
though harsh, the thirty-day period must be complied with 
or else jurisdiction is lost. 
In Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 4 Utah 2d 185, 
290 P. 2d 692, the following statement was made: 
"* * * The act provides that a party ag-
grieved by the action of the Commission may apply 
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for a rehearing or seek a review in this court within 
times prescribed by law. This is the exclusive means 
of securing a review of a determination made on 
any given state of facts. * * *" P. 694. 
Therefore, since the statute had been complied with 
and notice had been given to the plaintiff, which is certi-
fied pursuant to Exhibit A attached to the answer of de-
fendant to plaintiff's motion, there is no jurisdiction for 
this court and the writ of certiorari should be dismissed. 
The Industrial Commission is excused by statute from 
following rules of civil procedure in Section 35-1-88, U. C. 
A. 1953, as follows: 
"The commission shall not be bound by the 
usual common law or statutory rules of evidence, 
or by any technical or formal rules of procedure, 
other than as herein provided; but may make its 
investigations in such manner as in its judgment is 
best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights 
of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of 
this title." 
Therefore, even though Section 35-1-83, U. C. A. 1953, 
requires notice to be given, the notice contemplated is the 
notice to the claimant himself, which was given pursuant 
to Exhibit A of defendant's answer to plaintiff's motion, 
which was heard on February 3, 1964, and no notice need 
be given to the attorney as required in Rule 5 (b) (1) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
It should be noted that Rule 5(b) (1) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows: 
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"Whenever under these rules service is re-
quired or permitted to be made upon a party repre-
sented by an attorney * * *." (Emphasis added.) 
There is no civil rule of procedure in Utah requiring 
notice to be served upon plaintiff or his attorney by the 
defendant Industrial Commission, and therefore Rule 
6(b) (1) does not apply, and the notice to claimant is 
deemed a valid notice, as were all other notices and com-
munications directly between the plaintiff and defendant. 
The only requirement of Section 35-1-83, U. C. A. 1953, is 
notice to the claimant, plaintiff in this instance, and any 
other requirement by this court would in effect be a legis-
lative change of the statute. 
POINT II. 
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE INDUS-
TRIAL COMMISSION ARE BASED UPON 
SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND 
SHOULD NOT BE OVERRULED. 
It has been well reasoned by the Supreme Court that 
pursuant to Section 35-1-84, U. C. A. 1953, only if all the 
evidence is contrary to the findings of fact by the Indus-
trial Commission will said Commission be reversed. There 
are numerous cases decided by the Supreme Court indicat-
ing that this is the general rule of law. 
In Sutton, et al., v. Industrial Commission, 9 Utah 2d 
339, 344 P. 2d 538, the Supreme Court held that as long as 
there is any credible evidence in the record to sustain the 
findings of the Commission, this is sufficient to uphold the 
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Commission, and that there is no arbitrariness or capri-
ciousness in its decision. 
It should be noted that in this particular case the 
plaintiff testified that he was being paid $6.00 an hour for 
the work for Superior Oil Company, and that his usual 
charge was $4.00 an hour (R. 54, 55), and that the addi-
tional takes care of the equipment and supplies (R. 48, 49, 
51). 
In the case of Christean v. Industrial Commission, 113 
Utah 451, 196 P. 2d 502, the court discusses the matter of 
employee versus independent contractor, and quotes from 
the Restatement of the Law of Agency, Par. 220, page 483, 
as found therein as follows : 
" ( 1) A servant is a person employed to per-
form service for another in his affairs and who, 
with respect to this physical conduct in the per-
formance of the service, is subject to the other's 
control or right to control. 
"(2) In determining whether one acting for 
another is a servant or an independent contractor, 
the following matters of fact, among others, are 
considered : 
"a. The extent of control which, by the agree-
ment, the master may exercise over the details of 
the work; 
"b. whether or not the employed is engaged in 
a distinct occupation or business; 
"c. the kind of occupation, with reference to 
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done 
under the direction of the employer or by a special-
ist without supervision; 
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.. d. the skill required in the particular occu-
pation; 
"e. whether the employer or the workman 
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place 
of work for the person doing the work; 
"f. the length of time for which the person 
is employed; 
"g. the method of payment, whether by the 
time or by the job; 
"h. whether or not the work is a part of the 
regular business of the employer; and 
"i. whether or not the parties believe they are 
creating the relationship of master and servant." 
(Quoted from 196 P. 2d p. 505.) 
In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 12 U. 2d 223, 364 P. 2d 1020, on page 224 the court 
stated: 
"The court has on numerous occasions been 
concerned with the question whether one perform-
ing service for another was an employee, and there-
fore covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
or an independent contractor. What the relation-
ship is depends upon the particular fact situation. 
It is the prerogative and the responsibility of the 
Commission to make this determination and it is so 
well established as to hardly justify repetition that 
its action will be sustained if there is any substan-
tial credible evidence to support it so that it cannot 
properly be classified as capricious or arbitrary." 
The mere fact that Mr. Townsley, who is an employee 
of Mountain States Drilling Company, demonstrated to the 
plaintiff the work to be done, was not the type of control 
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which would make the plaintiff an employee in lieu of an 
independent contractor. There is no indication that Mr. 
Townsley was a welder or knew anything about welding, 
in order to exercise control as to the exact manner of per-
forming the work, and there is indication (R. 51, 52) that 
the plaintiff did have some activity as a professional 
welder, and that the plaintiff alone was responsible for the 
detail of welding. When there is any credible evidence to 
sustain an Industrial Commission finding, it is this court's 
duty to affirm the Commission. Sutton v. Industrial Com-
mission, supra; 35-1-84, U. C. A. 1953. 
In Burton v. Industrial Commission, 13 Utah 2d 353, 
374 P. 2d 439, this court said at page 554: 
"In order to reverse the finding and order made 
Plaintiff must show that there is such credible un-
contradicted evidence in her favor that the Com-
mission's refusal to so find was capricious and ar-
bitrary." 
See also Morris v. Industrial Commission, 90 Utah 256, 61 
P. 2d 415; Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Commission, 99 
Utah 423, 107 P. 2d 1027; 134 A. L. R. 1006. 
The mere fact of showing the plaintiff what work was 
needed was not exercising control so as to make the plain-
tiff an employee. Every independent contractor has to be 
shown and given orders as to when and where certain work 
will be done and then performs his skill without control. 
Gogoff v. Industrial Commission, 77 Utah 355, 296 P. 229. 
Furthermore, the evidence shows that the plaintiff 
had all the equipment and supplies of a welder (R. 49, 50, 
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51), and that the two alleged employers did not have such 
equipment (R. 50), and that the plaintiff had been a pro-
fessional welder in a separate occupation to that of either 
alleged employer who were in the business of oil drilling. 
Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 U. 309, 172 P. 2d 
136. The plaintiff was paid $2.00 an hour for his special 
skill and for furnishing his own equipment, tools, supplies, 
and transportation. 
The distinction hereinabove made is set forth in the 
Christean v. Industrial Commission case wherein the court 
quotes from the Restatement of the Law of Agency, Par. 
220, page 485 : 
''* * * The important distinction is be-
tween service in which the actor's physical activi-
ties and his time are surrendered to the control of 
the master, and service under an agreement to ac-
complish results or to use care and skill in accom-
plishing results. Those rendering service but re-
taining control over the manner of doing it are not 
servants. They may be agents, agreeing only to 
use care and skill to accomplish a result and subject 
to the fiduciary duties of loyalty and obedience to 
the wishes of the principal; or they may be persons 
employed to accomplish or to use care to accomplish 
physical results, without fiduciary obligations, as 
where a contractor is paid to build a house. An 
agent who is not subject to control as to the man-
ner in which he performs the acts that constitute 
the execution of his agency is in a similar relation 
to the principal as to such conduct as one who 
agrees only to accomplish mere physical results. 
* * *" 
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(Quoted from 196 P. 2d, p. 513.) 
We submit that in the case now before the court there 
was substantial evidence to support the findings and Order 
of the Commission, and that said findings and Order should 
be affirmed. 
POINT III. 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT SHOWN THAT 
THE DEPOSITION OF RAY TOWNSLEY IS 
INCORRECT OR EVEN THAT IT IS INJURI-
OUS TO THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE 
PLAINTIFF AND THE DEPOSITION WAS 
CORRECTLY ADMITTED BY THE INDUS-
TRIAL COMMISSION. 
It should be noted that notice was given to plaintiff 
of the taking of a deposition of Mr. Ray Townsley and that 
at this time the plaintiff was not represented by counsel. 
The deposition was taken under Rules 26 and 30 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and there is no indication 
other than the failure to give notice that this deposition 
was contrary to the interests of the plaintiff. The Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, pursuant to 32 (d), as well as the 
federal rule, require that a motion to suppress must be 
made within a reasonable time of any deposition, etc., which 
is irregularly filed, etc., or the party waives his right to 
object, if any objection he has. Barron & Holtzoff, Federal 
Practices and Procedures, Vol. 2A, Sec. 641-870; Oates V. 
S. J. Groves & Sons Co., C. A. 6th 1957, 248 Fed. 388, 202 
F. Supp. 181. The excuse given by the plaintiff was that 
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he did not have sufficient funds to be present at the depo-
sition, even though Rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure was not invoked by plaintiff, and yet plaintiff 
requested that Mr. Ray Townsley be present to testify be-
fore the Commission without any showing of the manner 
or method by which Mr. Townsley's presence would be ob-
tained or paid for. There appears no definite point of proof 
that the plaintiff is requesting from the deposition or testi-
mony of Mr. Townsley nor is there any showing or contro-
verted evidence of the deposition which plaintiff alleges is 
harmful, except that no notice was given, and, therefore, 
the deposition was rightfully admitted by the Industrial 
Commission and the contents therein should and could be 
used for any determination by the Industrial Commission. 
Any right that the plaintiff may have had under Rules 
30(b) and 32(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have 
terminated, and the deposition of Mr. Townsley could be 
used and certainly should be considered as evidence by the 
Commission, and was rightfully admitted. 
There does not seem to be any direct or positive in-
jury to the plaintiff from the deposition of Ray Townsley, 
and because of Section 35-1-88, U. C. A. 1953, supra, there 
seems to be no need for notice to be given of filing of a 
deposition before the Industrial Commission, because the 
Act does not require it, and the Commission is not bound 
by the Rules of Civil Procedure, because of Section 35-1-88, 
U. C. A. 1953, heretofore mentioned. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the defendant's answer to 
plaintiff's motion should be granted and the plaintiff's writ 
of certiorari dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, or in the 
alternative, the findings and the Order of the Industrial 
Commission should be affirmed by this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney 'General, 
RONALD N. SPRATLING, JR., 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
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